This study analyzes the relationship between religion and political behavior in recent presidential elections in the United States. The magnitude of the religious cleavage remains substantial but has declined during the past nine presidential elections. The single factor behind this decline is the reduction in support for Republican candidates among denominationally liberal Protestants, whose changing voting behavior is a function of their increasingly liberal views of social issues. The political alignments of Catholics and conservative Protestants have been very stable relative to the electorate-wide mean over this time period, and the authors find no evidence of increased political mobilization among conservative Protestants.
). Yet numerous comparative analyses suggest that, in many polities, religious-based cleavages may have been a more important factor for understanding the social bases of voter alignments than the class cleavage (Rose and Unwin 1969; Converse 1974; Rose 1974; Lijphart 1979; Dahl 1982, chap. 4; Powell 1982; Mann 1995) .
Interest in the relationship between religion and politics has been especially well developed in the United States, which has long appeared exceptional in the degree to which religion has influenced social and political life. Americans routinely claim higher levels of church membership and attendance at religious services and are more likely to believe in God and claim that religion is of considerable importance in their lives than citizens in other postindustrial capitalist democracies (Burnham 1981; Lopatto 1985; Gallup 1985 Gallup , 1995 Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1988; Wald 1992, chap. 1; Tiryakian 1993; Lipset 1996) . Although the common European pattern of a secular left coalition contesting for power against a conservative coalition rooted in religious groups made little headway in the United States, political historians have long emphasized the importance of ethnoreligious cleavages for 19th-and early-20th-century U.S. party coalitions (Kleppner 1970 (Kleppner , 1979 Jensen 1971; McCormick 1986; Swierenga 1990; Skocpol 1992, chap. 1) .
Despite expectations that the New Deal political realignment in the 1930s would lead to a pattern of electoral alignments dominated by class, the political significance of religious cleavages has proved to be resilient throughout the 20th century. While Catholics and Jews have long provided bedrock support for the Democratic Party, mainline Protestant sects generally remained solidly Republican in their preferences during and after the New Deal era (see, e.g., Fowler and Hertzke 1995, pp. 86-87) . Perhaps because of this stability, the role of religious cleavages in structuring voting behavior received significantly less attention than might otherwise have been expected. Indeed, it has only been over the last 15 years or so that social scientists have begun to reexamine systematically the relationship between religious group membership and political behavior (Wald 1992, chap. 1; Leege 1993a ). Much of this interest has been prompted in part by the emergence of politically active Christian Right groups, as well as considerable turmoil among the established denominational families.
This article contributes to the recent resurgence of interest in religion and politics.
2 Our analysis employs three significant innovations. First, we employ a set of measures for assessing the overall magnitude of the religious cleavage in American politics based on a multicategory denominational scheme. Second, we develop a set of models for exploring the interrelationship between religion and political behavior that distinguish political trends affecting all religious groups from political trends affecting (only) specific religious groups. Although these techniques have been utilized in analyses of other types of political cleavages (e.g., Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Evans 1998) , they have not yet been deployed in the study of religious politics. Finally, we use regression decomposition techniques to analyze the most important source of religious political change in the period since 1960: the movement of liberal Protestants from rockribbed support for the Republican Party to a more neutral posture in recent elections. The article is in four parts. In part 1, we provide an overview of the recent debates, focusing on four theses about changes in the religious political cleavage and the political behavior of specific religious groups in the electorate. We then discuss the theoretical concepts of the (denominationally based) religious cleavage and group-specific voting trends used in the study. In part 3, we present the results of our analyses, first considering trends in presidential vote choice and turnout between 1960 and 1992 and then more detailed examinations of political change among Catholics, liberal Protestants, and conservative Protestants. We discuss the implications our findings have for understanding the magnitude and evolution of the religious cleavage in the concluding section.
DEBATES OVER RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES
Scholarly analyses of religion and presidential politics in the United States since the 1950s suggest four main hypotheses, which can be summarized as follows.
3 most notably the Civil Rights movement (e.g., Morris 1984) . But an analysis of these influences would take us beyond the scope of this article. Moreover, the research hypotheses we consider focus explicitly on the impact of religious differences among nonblack voters. 3 Our focus in this study is on denominational membership as a source of political alignments. Other recent scholarship has investigated the effects of levels of religiosity, the contextual effects of individual churches on their members, and the role of religious salience and doctrinal beliefs as an alternative to denominational analyses (see, e.g., Kellstedt, Smidt, and Kellstedt 1991, pp. 142-43) . However, because of the limitations of the available data sources, research on historical trends at the national level dating back before 1980 and incorporating a range of explanatory variables is primarily limited to questions about the association between denominational preference, church attendance, and political behavior. Since our concerns are with long-term historical trends, the focus of this article is on the political consequences of membership in We consider the research literatures that have generated each of these hypotheses below.
The Declining Religious Cleavage Thesis
Two distinct trends have shaped debates about the overall magnitude of the religious cleavage in American politics. On the one hand, the growing public prominence of activist organizations associated with the Christian Right has led many analysts to hypothesize the rising importance of religion in U.S. politics (see below for the Christian Right thesis). The Christian Right is said to have politicized certain core social and religious values, with the effect of bringing religious conservatives into the political process or deepening the preferences of the highly devout for Republican candidates (e.g., Simpson 1985; Himmelstein 1990; Diamond 1995) . In other versions of this argument, the most important emerging social cleavage for party coalitions " [includes] , on one side, believers who organize their lives around religious commitments, while the other side would attract nonbelievers and those for whom religion is unimportant" (Kellstedt et al. 1994, p. 322 ; see also Green and Guth 1991; Hunter 1991) .
Other scholarly accounts have rejected these arguments, suggesting instead that the political significance of religion, like many other socialstructural attributes, is declining in its capacity to influence voters. One approach emphasizes the "declining significance of denominationalism" (Wuthnow 1988, chap. 5; 1993, pp. 156-57; Hunter 1991, pp. 86-87) . This approach asserts that increased social differentiation within denominations, rising levels of religious mobility and intermarriage, and declining organizational conflicts have decreased the political relevance of denominational membership. A second argument emphasizes the growing secularization of citizens as a source of declining political influence of religion a religious denomination, although we also utilize a measure of religiosity (church attendance) as a control variable in our analyses. (Inglehart 1990; but cf. Hout and Greeley 1987) . The "secularization thesis" has been a staple of comparative analyses of religion and politics in recent years (see Dobbelaere [1984] for overview and references).
Some researchers have offered empirical support for these propositions. For example, in the most recent of their ongoing series on changes in the social bases of American political behavior, Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1994, chap. 5 ) present evidence of declines in the political importance of region, union membership, class, and religious cleavages. Their measure of religious voting is based primarily on a dichotomous conceptualization: the percentage of Catholics who voted Democratic minus the percentage of Protestants who voted Democratic (see Abramson et al. 1994, p. 156) . Using this measure, Abramson et al. find that religious political cleavages declined from a high in 1960 (.48) to a low in 1980 (.10), rising again somewhat through 1992 (.20) among white voters (cf. Wattenberg and Miller 1981, p. 359; Miller and Wattenberg 1984, pp. 301-2; Brint and Kelley 1993, p. 307) . Using a related pair of contrasts between Republican voters versus Protestant or Jewish Democrats, Carmines and Stanley (1992, p. 224 ) find a similar picture of declining religious political cleavages in their analyses of the 1972-88 presidential elections. However, systematic evidence of change in the overall religious cleavage has not yet been established at the national level using a more differentiated conception of denominational identities than the crude Protestant versus Catholic dichotomy employed in these studies. Dichotomous approaches can potentially mislead, for growing divisions among Protestants (especially the growth of the Christian Right) go undetected by analysts using a single, undifferentiated Protestant category (see Kellstedt 1993, p. 276) .
The Christian Right Thesis
The second widely debated thesis about religion and politics in both the mass media and among political analysts concerns the possibility of a political realignment among conservative Protestant voters. The sudden emergence of the "Christian Right" in the late 1970s as a factor in U.S. politics and the visible role of some early Christian Right groups such as the Moral Majority in the 1980 elections seemed to herald a new type of political conflict in which religious values were becoming central to voters' decisions. In the relatively brief period since 1980, however, the varying fortunes of the Christian Right have prompted cyclical dismissal and then rediscovery of religious conservatism as a political force (Green 1995, p. 1) . Notwithstanding the outpouring of journalistic and media commentary during the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections, the search for a mass base to the Christian Right in the 1980s unearthed surprisingly modest support for groups such as the Moral Majority (Buell and Sigelman 1985; Perkins 1989) . Indeed, by the late 1980s, many informed observers were emphasizing the sharp decline of the Christian Right, at least as a force in national politics (Bruce 1988 (Bruce , 1994 Jelen 1991; D'Antonio 1992; Fowler 1993; Wilcox 1994) .
In the 1990s, the cycle of debates over the Christian Right appears to have come around again, with a number of analysts reporting evidence that evangelical Christian voters have become increasingly pro-Republican in recent elections (Himmelstein 1990; Green and Guth 1991, p. 217; Kellstedt and Green 1993, p. 56; Kellstedt et al. 1994, p. 308; Diamond 1995, chap. 10; Rozell and Wilcox 1995; Miller and Shanks 1996, chap. 10) . Given that many of the most important cases of Christian Right activism have occurred at the state or local level, notably the activism of the Christian Coalition (Rozell and Wilcox 1995) , the Christian Right thesis has implications for political behavior at all levels of U.S. politics.
The Catholic Dealignment Thesis
A third widely debated issue among analysts of religion and politics concerns the possibility that Catholic voters are shifting away from alignment with the Democratic Party toward a more neutral posture (Lopatto 1985; Petrocik 1981 Petrocik , 1987 Kenski and Lockwood 1991; Green and Guth 1991; Kellstedt 1989; Kellstedt and Noll 1990; Kellstedt and Green 1993) . Abramson et al. (1994, p. 156) even characterize this shift as "precipitous." Writing in the early 1980s, Dionne (1981, p. 308) suggested that "loyalty to the Democratic Party has been something on the order of a theological commitment for a large share of America's Catholic community." Indeed, evidence from early Gallup polls suggests that as many as 80% of all Catholic voters backed Roosevelt in 1936 , 73% in 1940 and 1944 , and 66% supported Truman in 1948 (Gallup and Castelli 1987 Kenski and Lockwood 1991, p. 175) . In more recent elections, however, significantly smaller proportions of Catholic voters have supported Democratic presidential candidates. From this, virtually all analysts of the Catholic vote have concluded that Catholics are now a "swing" constituency susceptible to election-specific economic conditions (e.g., Kenski and Lockwood 1991, p. 173; Kellstedt et al. 1994, pp. 323-24) or candidate-centered appeals (Fowler and Hertzke 1995, p. 96) . 4 The main explanation for this hypothesized shift among Catholics is that they have become progressively more affluent over time, matching or even surpassing Protestants on a number of measures of socioeconomic attainment (Green and Guth 1991, p. 214; Kellstedt 1989, p. 99; Kellstedt and Noll 1990, p. 359-61; Kenski and Lockwood 1991, p. 174) . Indeed, the most systematic reviews of the evidence suggest that by the 1980s Catholics had reached parity with the "Protestant elite" in terms of average income and were closing the gap in terms of access to positions of power and influence (see esp. Greeley 1990, chap. 7 ; on access to elite positions, see Davidson, Pyle, and Reyes [1995] ). In this study, we analyze the effect of changes in economic affluence among Catholics. However, before accepting the Catholic dealignment thesis, it is necessary to first determine whether Catholic voters have shifted relative to the electorate as a whole.
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The Liberal/Mainline Protestant Dealignment Thesis
The fourth thesis we consider concerns the historically most Republican bloc of religious voters, the "mainline" or "elite" Protestant denominations. The members of these denominational families, especially Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists (United Church of Christ), have long been overrepresented among the American political elite (Mills 1956; Baltzell 1964 Baltzell , 1991 Davidson et al. 1995) and in business, academe, and the military establishment (e.g., Karabel 1984; Domhoff 1967 Domhoff , 1983 . Reflecting their social and cultural power in American society, the "Protestant establishment" has thus been viewed by many social scientists as a solidly Republican constituency.
In recent years, however, the political stability of the mainline and liberal Protestant denominations has been questioned. Several analysts have found evidence of a shift among the broader group of mainline Protestants away from the Republican Party and toward the Democrats (Lopatto 1985; Kellstedt 1994 et al.; Kivisto 1994) . These findings cannot be considered conclusive, however, as other scholars have denied there is any evidence of changing political alignments among mainline Protestants (Petrocik 1987; Kellstedt and Noll 1990) . As with the Christian Right and Catholic analyses, we reexamine these issues through an analysis over 5 To the extent that Catholics have become no more Republican since 1960 than other groups, the de-/realignment thesis is not supported. As with the Christian Right thesis, we test such claims through an analysis of historical trends in voting since 1960 (using our multicategory scheme) and 1952 (using a simplified comparison necessitated by the more limited information about Protestant religious affiliations available in the 1952 and 1956 NES). By examining whether Catholics' vote choices differ when controls for income and education are added to the model, we also analyze the effect of rising affluence among Catholics on their political alignment.
time that distinguishes electorate-wide shifts from changes in the political behavior of specific religious groups.
Unlike the other denominational debates, fewer scholars have attempted to theorize the sources of shifts among liberal Protestants. The receptivity of mainline Protestant religious leaders to politically liberal messages on "social issues," beginning in the 1960s with the Vietnam War and continuing more recently on issues such as racial and gender inequality, suggests one possible explanation for the relative shift away from the Republican Party (Quinley 1974a (Quinley , 1974b Neuhaus 1984; Hallum 1991; Guth et al. 1991) . Conversely, Leege (1993b) emphasizes the political consequences of the sharp falloff in regular church attendance among liberal Protestants as a factor encouraging political change among this group, especially among younger people (see also Sweet 1989) . Finally, the loss of economic and political power to non-Protestant groups-albeit only relative-suggests a third possible source for the movement of liberal Protestants away from the Republican Party and toward the Democrats (Davidson et al. 1995) . We evaluate these competing explanations of the source of political change among liberal Protestants.
CONCEPTUALIZING THE RELIGIOUS POLITICAL CLEAVAGE Our first step in developing a systematic test of the four preceding theses is to provide a suitable conception of the religious political cleavage. This task is especially important in light of the continuing reliance by some analysts on simplified schemes that do not draw distinctions among Protestant voters. In this study, we thus adopt a multicategory scheme based on the denominational typology devised by Stark and Glock (1968) and Lopatto (1985; cf. Smith 1990) . This scheme distinguishes between "liberal," "moderate," and "conservative" Protestants on the basis of doctrinal positions and beliefs of followers. Our scheme also distinguishes Catholics, Jews, those with no religious identification (including atheists), and people belonging to other religions. Full details of our denominational coding scheme are provided in appendix table A2.
Using these conceptual distinctions, we arrive at the following seven mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories: liberal Protestants, moderate Protestants, conservative Protestants, Catholics, Jews, other religions, and no religion.
This denominational scheme enables us to develop estimates of change in the relationship between religion and political behavior. We call this relationship the "religious political cleavage," which we define as the existence of differences in presidential vote choice among these seven religious groups. So long as there are (significant) differences in the voting behavior of the groups in our analyses, we can speak of a "religious cleavage" in presidential politics. Our primary main concern is with the degree of change over time in the magnitude of the religious cleavage, and the index we develop in this article yields scores that enable comparisons over time.
Change in the Religious Cleavage versus Change among Specific Religious Groups
The preceding concept of the religious cleavage suggests two distinct ways in which religion can affect political behavior: at the level of specific religious groups and at the level of the religious cleavage as a whole. While changes at these two levels tend to co-vary, this need not always be the case. If, for instance, Catholics fall out of a Democratic alignment (thus becoming more like the rest of the electorate in their voting behavior) while conservative Protestants shift toward support for Republican candidates, these two group-specific changes may cancel one another out, leaving the overall religious cleavage largely unchanged. The four theses we analyze in this study refer to changes at both levels. While the declining religious cleavage thesis is about all seven religious groups, the claims about change among Catholics, liberal Protestants, and conservative Protestants are primarily about specific groups of religious voters.
DATA AND MEASURES

Dependent and Independent Variables
For the analyses presented in this article, we use data from the Center for Political Studies' pre-and postelection National Election Studies (NES) for presidential elections from 1960 through 1992 (Center for Political Studies 1995) . By combining data from individual election surveys into a single file in which year is itself coded as a variable, we are able to directly measure political trends in the religious cleavage and also in the behavior of specific religious groups. 6 In addition to the historical period covered by these nine elections, we also supplement our analyses with data from the 1952 and 1956 NES surveys. While the 1952 and 1956 surveys do not contain sufficient information to distinguish among Protestant sects, they nevertheless allow us to broaden our time frame in order to assess the uniqueness of Catholics' strong support for Kennedy in 1960.
To provide a systematic evaluation of the four theses, we have selected three dependent variables: presidential vote choice (coded "1" for the Democratic candidate and "0" for the Republican candidate); voter turnout (coded "1" for voters and "0" for nonvoters); and party identification (coded using the Michigan partisanship scale ranging from "1" for strong Republican to "7" for strong Democrat).
7 While much of our interest centers on presidential vote choice, the turnout variable is useful as a measure of religious-based mobilization, which has particular relevance to the Christian Right thesis. Party identification is likewise useful in examining whether the voting trend we uncover for liberal Protestants has been accompanied by a shift in partisanship (thereby suggesting a partisan realignment). We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyze the trends in party identification among the seven denominational groups and logistic regression models to analyze the two dichotomous dependent variables. 8 As discussed earlier, we use a seven-category denominational scheme for identifying religious groups, treating "other religion" as the reference in the regressions. We have constructed the scheme to take into account some of the peculiarities of the early years of the NES series, most notably the failure of the pre-1972 NES to distinguish Southern Baptists from other Baptist sects. 9 Full coding details are presented in the appendix. Our analyses of trends yield two sets of estimates of change in the religion-vote choice/turnout relationship. We derive the first of these estimates from modeling the effect of religion without any controls, the second from a model that incorporates controls. For this second set of estimates, we add age, education, region, household income, and church attendance to the model to determine whether change in these variables is related to change in the religious political cleavage (or in the behavior of specific groups). Education and income, in particular, are relevant as measures of the growth of affluence and status among religious voters (they thus have particular relevance to the Catholic dealignment thesis). Age (years), edu-7 More specifically, the seven categories are strong Republican, weak Republican, independent Republican, independent, independent Democrat, weak Democrat, and strong Democrat. For recent discussion of the logic of this scheme, see Miller and Shanks (1996, chap. 6) . 8 Recent scholarly interest in voting for independent or third party candidates underscores the possible relevance that third party vote choice may have for the religious cleavage. As a side note, we present in the appendix additional analyses of third party voting to determine whether religious group membership had a significant impact on support for George Wallace and Ross Perot in the 1968 and 1992 elections. 9 We differ from Lopatto (1985) in placing all Baptists into the conservative Protestant category, both before and after 1972 to maintain internal consistency. (Before 1972, Lopatto places all Baptists in his moderate category but after 1972 places Southern Baptists in the conservative category.) However, we have also created a Southern Baptist dummy variable to test whether placing more moderate Baptist sects in the conservative Protestant category affects our estimates of political trends. We also note that most analysts employing a two-category scheme (e.g., Leege and Kellstedt 1993) , place all Baptists in their "evangelical" category. cation (years), and income (dollars) are measured as continuous variables, while region is a dummy variable ("1" for South, "0" other regions). To estimate the effect of household income for the entire 1960-92 period, we have scaled income to 1992 dollars for each election year in the analyses.
In addition to the preceding variables, we also add a variable for regular church attendance to the model (coded "1" for regular attendance and "0" otherwise).
10 Regular church attendance provides attendees with greater exposure to religious messages, and adding attendance in our model thus enables us to analyze whether changing voting patterns among specific religious groups are related to changing patterns of church attendance. In the course of evaluating statistical models, we also test for two-way interactions between regular attendance and religious group membership.
Our analyses are presented in four stages. In the first stage, we analyze presidential vote choice, voter turnout, and party identification using our seven-category scheme for the entire 1960-92 period. Our goal here is to weigh the evidence for political trends in the behavior of specific groups as well as in the overall religious cleavage. In the second stage of the analyses, we examine in further detail the surprising evidence of an absence of trends among Catholic voters-in spite of their growing economic affluence-found in our initial estimates. The third stage examines the causes of liberal Protestants' movement away from the Republican Party. The fourth stage uses a finer-grained measure distinguishing Southern from other Baptists to search for any additional evidence for political trends occurring among the category of conservative Protestants that might have been missed in the first round of analyses.
Statistical Models
To analyze our two dichotomous dependent variables (presidential choice and turnout), we use a logistic regression framework. We compare a series of competing models to arrive at a preferred model of change in the relationship between these variables and religious group membership.
11 Our 10 The NES introduced changes in the response categories of this item during and after the 1972 survey. To maintain consistency with the pre-1972 categories, we have dichotomized this item, coding "every week/almost every week" as what was previously "regular" reported attendance. The nearly identical rates of regular attendance using this measure (.436 in 1968 and .439 in 1972) lend support to this coding decision. For discussions of the importance of incorporating religiosity measures in models of religious politics, see esp. Leege (1993b; 1996) . 11 We choose our preferred models of religious voting using the Ϫ2 log-likelihood statistic (Ϫ2LL) and Raftery's (1986 Raftery's ( , 1995 Bayesian information criterion (BIC), which is calculated for logistic regression models as D Ϫ (df )log(N), where D is the residual simplest model of change in the interrelationship between religion and presidential vote choice serves as a baseline for subsequent comparisons.
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This model includes terms for the main effects of election year and religion; however, because it does not include any religion-by-election interactions, it assumes that shifts in presidential vote choice affect all religious groups equally. In this model, the dependent variable is the natural log of the odds of choosing the Democratic over the Republican presidential candidate, which we designate by Φ ij for vote choice j ( j ϭ 1 for the Democratic and 0 for the Republican candidate) for person i:
In equation (1), C ik are dummy variables for the k election years in the analyses (k ϭ 1 for 1960, 2 for 1964, . . . , 9 for 1992), and D il are dummy variables for the seven religious categories (l ϭ 1 for no religion, 2 for liberal Protestant, 3 for moderate Protestant, 4 for conservative Protestant, 5 for Catholic, 6 for Jewish, and 7 for other religion). 13 The parameters to be estimated in this model are the constant, α j , for the "other religion" category's log-odds of voting Democratic in the 1960 election, the β kj terms for the effect of each of the k elections on vote choice (the T superscript designates this as the election year variable), and the β lj for the effect of the l religious categories on vote choice (with the R superscript designating this as the religion variable).
Our preferred model of religious voting is summarized in equation (2). Despite the necessarily cumbersome notation, the model's implied hypotheses about voting trends are relatively simple. The three new β terms (superscripted by RT to indicate a religion by time interaction) represent hypotheses about voting trends for three specific religious groups: liberal Protestants (l ϭ 2), conservative Protestants (l ϭ 4), and Catholics (l ϭ 5). For liberal Protestants, the β 2j term's election-year-by-liberal-Protestant interaction is constrained by Y i0 , a fixed score for person i, which is coded "0" to "8" for the election years (i.e., 0 for 1960, 1 for 1964, . . . , 8 for 1992). Given this linear constraint, the inclusion of this new parameter in the model represents the hypothesis that liberal Protestants' likelihood of deviance (Ϫ2 log likelihood) for the model under consideration, df is its degrees of freedom, log is the natural logarithm, and N is the sample size. 12 Given that our models of religion and voter turnout are structurally similar to the models of partisan vote choice, we do not present them formally. 13 To identify the model, we set the highest β lj (for "other religion") and the lowest β kj (for the 1960 election) equal to zero. There are thus six parameters for the religion variable and eight parameters for the election year variable to be estimated in this and in subsequent models.
choosing the Democratic candidate has increased at a constant rate (in logits) for each election since 1960.
The β 4j and β 5j terms refer respectively to more limited patterns of change among conservative Protestants and Catholics. The fixed score Z i0 is coded "1" for the 1976 and 1980 elections (when born-again presidential candidate Jimmy Carter was running for office) and "0" otherwise, and it constrains the conservative-Protestant-by-year interaction to refer to their tendency to favor the Democratic candidate during these two elections. The V i0 term is coded "1" for the 1960 election and "0" otherwise, and it constrains the Catholic-by-year interaction to refer to Catholic voters' disproportionate support for John Kennedy.
14 The remaining models (including our final model, which adds age, education, income, region, and church attendance) are nested extensions of the two preceding models and are discussed in the results section of the article. 15 An Index of the Religious Political Cleavage Using the coefficients of our preferred models of presidential vote choice and turnout for the 1960-92 period, we can construct an index of change in the religious political cleavage. By summarizing the information contained in the model's coefficients, this index provides us with a measure of the magnitude of the religious cleavage at a given election. Because it is measured in standard deviations, this measure enables us to directly compare the magnitude of the cleavage at various elections, thereby gauging the evidence for trends over time.
Our measure of the religious cleavage in presidential vote choice is calculated as the average deviation of a given religious category from the overall mean. 16 This index is summarized in equation (3), where the βs are the coefficients of the model, and the t subscript for the index indicates that there is a single score for each of the election years:
Scores for this index measure the magnitude of the religious cleavage in deviations from the mean for a given election. When the voting behavior of religious groups differs, the standard deviation of the group-specific coefficients (i.e., the index) will increase; conversely, when the voting behavior of religious groups converges, the index score will approach zero. By examining whether these scores increase or decrease over time, we test whether a decline (or alternatively, an increase) has occurred in the religious political cleavage.
We use a series of graphical displays to present scores under our religious cleavage index. The first set of displays presents a pair of index scores, the first of which is the result of modeling only the effect of religion on vote choice, the second of which adds our controls to the model. The first set of scores thus are derived from the coefficients of our model incorporating no controls; the second set of scores are derived from the coefficients of the model once the controls have been added. Using the graphical displays, we can observe whether change in our five control variables has affected the magnitude of, and trends in, the religious political cleavage. Using household income as an example, this comparison tells us whether changes in economic affluence have had the effect of narrowing the denominationally based religious cleavage.
In addition to analyzing changes in the religious cleavage, we also consider the contribution of each of the specific religious groups in the analysis to this cleavage. In our second set of figures, we thus present our measures of religious group-specific voting behavior for each of the groups in the analyses. This measure is the (normalized) logit coefficient for the category in question, and because the coefficients sum to zero (for identification purposes), scores indicate a tendency for a particular religious group to vote Democratic (a positive sign) or Republican (a negative sign) in a given election. By graphing group-specific voting behavior by election year, we can thus determine whether the groups in the analyses have moved together from election to election or whether one or more groups have moved disproportionately toward support for one of the parties, thus showing evidence of a changing political alignment. Note.-df are presented in parentheses. BIC for null model (including a constant only) is Ϫ65,829. Linearly constrained interactions are designated by an asterisk; unconstrained interactions are designated by a multiplication cross. Dependent variable is coded "1" for choice of the Democratic presidential candidate, "0" for the Republican presidential candidate (African-American voters are excluded from the analyses). N ϭ 8,568.
a Scaled to constant 1992 dollars.
RESULTS
The Religious Political Cleavage and Group-Specific Trends since 1960
Our first set of analyses examines the evidence for change in the overall religious political cleavage and in the political behavior of the seven specific groups. In table 1, we present fit statistics for our competing models of presidential vote choice in the 1960-92 period. Model 2's Catholic-by-1960-election interaction results in an improvement in fit over model 1, which includes only the main effects of religion and election year. 18 Model 3 contains an additional term for a linear voting trend among liberal Protestants, and it results in an improvement over model 2's fit (the Ϫ11 BIC improvement of model 3 over model 2 represents strong evidence for this trend). Model 4 in turn provides a better fit to the data, adding a single parameter relating to conservative Protestants' voting behavior in the 1976 and 1980 elections (what we call in table 1 the "Carter effect").
In model 5, we test whether model 4's three religious-group-by-year interactions are sufficient to capture all sources of change in the interrelationship of religion and voting behavior. Model 5 allows the religious categories to interact freely with election year, thereby consuming 45 more parameters than model 4. Both Ϫ2LL and BIC readily select model 4 over model 5, demonstrating that trends in the religious cleavage can be succinctly captured by our three (constrained) religion-by-year interactions. Model 6 adds covariates for church attendance, income, education, age, and gender and interaction effects for church attendance by religious group and also with the 1992 election.
19 While model 4 is thus our preferred model of religious voting not controlling for socioeconomic change, model 6 is our preferred model with controls (both Ϫ2LL and BIC show that the effects of these controls on vote choice are significant).
In table 2, we present the coefficients from our two preferred models of change in the religious cleavage. The three statistically significant coefficients for liberal Protestants by year, Catholics by 1960, and conservative Protestants by 1976/80 are of particular interest. For Catholics, the 1.20 coefficient indicates that the log odds of Catholics choosing the Democratic candidates was 1.20 greater in 1960 than all other elections in the series. This translates into a 3.3-fold increase in the odds that Catholics favored the Democrat (John Kennedy) in this election. Similarly, conservative Protestants were disproportionately likely to favor born-again Baptist Jimmy Carter in 1976 and 1980 relative to the much lower levels of support they gave to Democratic candidates in other presidential elections.
The three coefficients are virtually unchanged in the first versus second columns, indicating that the additional variables in the model including controls do not explain these religious-group-by-year changes. Given that they refer to a single or pair of elections, Catholics' and conservative Protestants' voting "trends" are, however, less consequential for long-term changes in the religious cleavage than liberal Protestants' shift, which spans the entire 1960-92 period. We interpret Catholics' and conservative Protestants' unusual support for Democratic candidates as a product of ethnoreligious considerations: as a form of "identity" politics, these two groups gave unusually high levels of support to a member of their religious group. By contrast, the trend among liberal Protestants is clearly not explained by factors of this sort. The cumulative effects of this trend are, moreover, substantial: the .11 coefficient for liberal Protestants indicates 19 We note that adding additional terms for interactions between church attendance and (all) election years does not improve the fit of the model (Ϫ2LL ϭ 10494.58 at 7 df; BIC ϭ Ϫ66,742). Model 6's single attendance by year ϭ 1992 interaction effect is thus sufficient to capture the interaction between church attendance and time. fig. 2 , discussed below). How have these group specific changes in presidential vote choice affected the overall religious cleavage? More clearly than the raw coefficients, the charts displayed in figure 1 provide a graphical illustration. In figure 1 's right-hand panel, we present our twin sets of estimates for trends in the religious cleavage in presidential voting. The solid line shows the trend according to model 4 (without controls), the dotted line shows the 55 trend according to model 6 (with controls). Model 6's trend line is slightly higher at each election since 1968, indicating that the combined effect of the five covariates has been to actually enhance the total effect of religion on vote choice during these elections. With regard to trends, the critical finding conveyed by figure 1's right-hand panel is that both sets of estimates show a decline in the religious political cleavage. This decline of the religious cleavage between 1960 and 1980 is substantial, and the fact that the trend estimates for models 4 and 6 are parallel during most of the series is especially important, for it reveals that change in the five covariates cannot explain the majority of the net decline in the voting difference among the seven religious groups.
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In figure 1 's left-hand panel, we present, for purposes of comparison, estimates of trends in the religious cleavage according to model 1, the model that includes no religion-by-year interactions. While model 1's fit to data is, of course, much worse than either model 4 or model 6, its coefficients nevertheless contain useful information. These estimates show us what trends in religious voting would have looked like had liberal Protestants' long-term (and Catholics' and conservative Protestants' short-term) trends not occurred. Model 1's dashed trend line shows no net change from 1960 to 1992, revealing that the decline in the religious cleavage established in the preferred models is due entirely to the three categoryspecific trends.
In figure 2 , we examine how the presidential voting behavior of the specific religious groups in the analyses has contributed to the decline in total religious voting. Figure 2 's six panels display the group-specific trend estimates, and as before, the solid lines represent the trend according to model 4 and the dotted lines represent the trends according to model 6. (To conserve space, the "other religion" category is not shown here but is available upon request.) The three main groups of interest are liberal Protestants, Catholics, and conservative Protestants, given that the modeling results have already established the existence of year-by-category interactions for these groups.
The first panel shows that the voting trend among liberal Protestants has been steep relative to the (change in) the average presidential choice of all voters. Once the most Republican of all religious groups, liberal Protestants have moved to within close proximity to the x-axis (marking the point at which their fitted probability of voting for the Democratic candidate equals .5), suggesting a considerable movement away from their earlier political alignment. The nearly perfect congruence of the two trend The trend for Catholics is mostly captured in a single step from disproportionately high support for Kennedy in 1960 to much lower support for Democratic candidates in the remaining elections. Insofar as they remain above the figure's x-axis, however, Catholics continue to be in a (weak) Democratic political alignment (relative to the average religious voter), and the trend lines for the two preferred models are nearly congruent. Given that the current series goes back no further than the 1960 election, we utilize data from the 1952 and 1956 elections in the next stage of the analyses to measure more fully any evidence of a shift away from the Democratic Party among Catholics since the 1950s.
With the partial exception of two elections, conservative Protestants have consistently favored Republican candidates by a large margin. The trend estimates for models 4 and 6 are very similar, and these estimates are suggestive of a Republican voting trend only if one were to take the 1976 election as the baseline for assessing political change among this segment of the electorate. Jewish voters remain by far the most Democratic of religious groups, and our analyses show that their level of support has varied little (with the exception of the 1964 election) relative to the electorate-wide mean. Our results are consistent with the findings of other scholars who have found little evidence of any rightward shift among Jewish voters in spite of the Republican Party's repeated efforts in recent years to attract Jewish support (e.g., Lipset and Raab 1995, chap. 6; Sigelman 1991; Abramson et al. 1994, p. 156) .
Seculars-understood broadly as those who either identify themselves as atheists, agnostics, or as having no religious affiliation-are consistently Democratic throughout the 1960-92 period, although at a lower rate than Jews. While this result is perhaps not surprising in recent elections, the Republican Party's open embrace of religious values during the past two decades cannot per se explain seculars' support for Democratic candidates over the entire period. Accordingly, we find no evidence to support claims that seculars are becoming more Democratic over time, as Fowler and Hertzke (1995, pp. 104-5) have suggested. In fact, the high- 21 Indeed, much of the outpouring of journalistic analyses of an ostensibly surging New Right came in the wake of the 1980 and 1984 elections, in which conservative Protestants were moving away from the higher levels of support they accorded Carter in 1976 and 1980. This shift, however, becomes illusory when viewed from the standpoint of the entire time series. Note.-df are presented in parentheses. BIC for null model (including constant only) is Ϫ98,519. Linearly constrained interactions are designated by an asterisk; unconstrained interactions are designated by a multiplication cross. Dependent variable is coded "1" for voted and "0" for did not vote (AfricanAmerican voters are excluded from the analyses). N ϭ 11,885. a Scaled to constant 1992 dollars.
water mark of seculars' support for the Democratic Party came in 1964, in reaction to the Goldwater candidacy. The two residual categories in the analysis-moderate Protestants and "other" religions-are aligned with the Republican Party. Moderate Protestants are slightly more Republican in their voting behavior than conservative Protestants, and liberal Protestants' defection from the GOP has left moderates as the most consistently Republican of the three Protestant sects since 1976. 22 The "other religion" category's voting behavior (not shown) exhibits significant volatility from election to election. While they remain aligned with the Republican Party, their support for Republican candidates is considerably more variable than that of moderate and conservative Protestants.
Trends in Turnout and Party Identification
We now analyze the evidence for group-specific trends in voter turnout and party identification. We present in table 3 fit statistics for evaluating competing models of trends in the relationship between religious group membership and voter turnout. Model 2's improvement in fit over model 1 provides positive evidence of an interaction between conservative Protestants and voter turnout in the years in which Democrat Carter was running for the presidency. Model 3 does not, however, improve the fit of model 2, providing evidence that group-specific change in turnout rates among conservative Protestants were limited to the 1976 and 1980 elections. 23 Model 5 includes terms for the unconstrained interaction between election year and religious group. Model 5 does not, however, improve the fit of model 2 according to either Ϫ2LL or BIC, establishing that there are no more significant turnout trends among specific religious groups. Given that the control variables in model 6 result in a significant improvement in fit over model 2, model 6 is our preferred model of religious and voter turnout.
The coefficients of our preferred model (see table 4) show that Jewish voters enjoy the highest rate of turnout among the seven groups. The next largest coefficient is for Catholics, with liberal and moderate Protestants following close behind. The small coefficients (.18 and .19) for conservative Protestants and seculars are not statistically significant, indicating that turnout rates among these two groups are not distinguishable from the "other religion" category. While conservative Protestants are thus less likely than any religious group to actually vote, the 1976 and 1980 elections are an exception. In these two elections, our model predicts their log odds of voting increased by .48. The same force eliciting unusually high levels of Democratic Party support among conservative Protestants-the candidacy of a "born-again" presidential candidate-also led to higher than average voting rates among this segment of the electorate.
In similar fashion to the earlier presentation of the presidential vote choice results, we summarize in figure 3's panels our findings for religious voter turnout. 24 Five of the seven trend lines are essentially flat, with the "other religion" (not shown) exhibiting a net increase in the likelihood of voting and conservative Protestants experiencing a temporary, but sharp, boost in turnout in 1976 and 1980. Most important for the Christian Right thesis, there is no evidence of increasing participation by conservative Protestants at the ballot box since 1980.
23 Model 4's similar lack of improvement in fit over model 2 provides evidence that the two additional group-specific interactions with time we found for presidential vote choice (relating to Catholics and liberal Protestants) are irrelevant in the case of turnout. 24 Note that because they are calculated relative to the overall mean, the group-specific estimates of turnout rates in fig. 3 do not reveal the electorate-wide decline in turnout since 1960. This decline can, however, be observed from the election year (main effect) coefficients presented in table 4. In table 5, we consider religious group-specific trends in party identification during the 1960-92 period. The OLS model whose coefficients we present includes our control variables, as well as an additional (linearly constrained) interaction for Southern residence and election year; the latter coefficient (Ϫ.14; SE ϭ .02) represents the well-known breakup of the solid Democratic South. In addition to the main effects of religious group membership, we also estimate a series of interactions with time; all these are linear interactions with election year (coded "1" for 1960, "2" for 1964, Note.-Dependent variable is a seven-point scale ranging between "1" (strong Republican) and "7" (strong Democrat). N ϭ 8,568.
a Scaled to constant 1992 dollars. * P ϭ .05, two-tailed test.
. . . , and "9" for 1992), with the exception of Catholics, whose category is constrained to interact solely with the 1960 election (during which their Democratic identification is predicted by the model as being unusually high). The only two statistically significant religious-group-by-year coefficients are for Catholics and liberal Protestants. This implies that trends in party identification among the five remaining religious groups are fully captured by the changes expressed in the election year (or region by year) coefficients. The main finding of interest relates to the political trend for liberal Protestants. The statistically significant .10 coefficient translates into a sizable shift in party identification between 1960 and 1992-nearly a full point change (.80) on the seven-point scale in the direction of Democratic identification. This trend in party identification provides additional evidence that liberal Protestants' voting trend represents a partisan shift in political alignment, not merely a shift in voting patterns.
Catholics' Voting Behavior since 1952
Before any firm conclusions about change in Catholics' political alignment can be drawn, it is necessary to examine the period prior to the 1960 election. To test the hypothesis that Catholics have moved over time from strong to weak Democratic Party support, we need to determine whether Catholics' support in the 1950s for Democratic candidates (relative to other voters) was similar to their support for Kennedy over Nixon in 1960. If the latter condition is met, it would imply that Catholics' 1964-92 voting behavior represents a trend toward declining support for the Democratic Party (rather than a single election spike toward the Democratic Party in 1960).
To test this hypothesis, we present in table 6 fit statistics for models of Catholic vote choice for the entire 1952-92 period. Limitations in the information available on Protestant denominations prior to 1960 make it impossible to distinguish among Protestant voters, so for these analyses we treat them as the (homogeneous) reference category in our regressions.
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While this limitation would be problematic for obtaining estimates during the post-1960s period of the analyses (during which time liberal Protestants diverge substantially in their vote choice, thus leading to greater political heterogeneity among Protestants), it should not introduce any bias into our estimates of the Catholic vote in the 1950s. The reason for Note.-df are presented in parentheses. BIC for null model (including only a constant) is Ϫ84,531. Linearly constrained interactions are designated by an asterisk; unconstrained interactions are designated by a multiplication cross. Dependent variable is coded "1" for choice of Democratic presidential candidate, "0" for Republican presidential candidate (African-American voters are excluded from the analyses).
a Religious categories in the 1952-92 analyses are (homogeneous) Protestants and Catholics.
this is that our earlier analyses of presidential voting showed that all three Protestant denominational groups were very similar in their high levels of Republican Party support in the 1960s and thus can be expected to show similar voting patterns in the 1950s. Corroborating our earlier finding, model 2 (which adds a single interaction for Catholics in the 1960 election) improves over the fit of model 1 (which includes only terms for the main effects of religion and election year). In model 3, we add a second interaction term for Catholics' vote choice in 1952 and 1956 to test whether their voting patterns in the 1950s differed from the remainder of the series. 26 The clear lack of improvement in fit of model 3 over model 2 provides no support for this hypothesis.
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Model 4's additional terms (which allow the dummy variable for Catholics to interact freely with the election year variable) also worsen model 2's fit. These results establish two critical facts: Not only was the support of Catholics for the Democratic candidate in 1960 unusually high, their tendency to favor Democratic candidates in all other elections (relative to the corresponding preference of Protestant voters) shows no distinctive net trend (either toward or away from the Democratic Party) during the entire 1952-92 period. Corroborating our earlier analyses, we thus find that with the exception of 1960, Catholics' vote choice has fluctuated without any clear trend away from (or toward) the Democratic Party since the 1950s. These results also establish that the post-1960 decline in the religious political cleavage is entirely a product of liberal Protestants' dealignment from the Republican Party.
Liberal Protestants' Voting Trend
Of the group-specific trends we have investigated, the trend for liberal Protestants is of greatest consequence for the religious cleavage. Whereas the "trend" among Catholics and conservative Protestants is a function (respectively) of one or two elections, liberal Protestants' changing voting behavior has moved them from being the most Republican of any religious group to being nearly as likely to be Democratic as Republican in their presidential preference.
Using the 1972-92 NES surveys, we explore the causes explaining liberal Protestants' voting trend. 28 The items we use for these analyses measure an array of potentially relevant causal factors that may account for the phenomenon at hand. We summarize these items in table 7, along with their sample means for the election years defining the endpoints of the trend: 1972 and 1992. Most of these item means show net changes for the 1972-92 period, but to determine whether these changes actually explain liberal Protestants' trend, we must first obtain their coefficients from a multivariate model. Once we have estimated these coefficients, we use a regression decomposition to derive estimates of the contribution of each of the items in the analyses to explaining liberal Protestants' trend.
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These estimates are presented in table 8.
The estimates in the first column of this table are the change in presidential vote choice from 1972 to 1992 that is predicted using the regression coefficients and the change in the item's sample mean. The estimates in the second column are the proportion of the total (predicted) change in vote choice among liberal Protestants attributable to a row-specific fac- tor. 30 Using the results for gender as our example, the Ϫ.01 estimate indicates that on the basis of a decrease in the proportion of female liberal Protestants since 1972, we predict a very slight shift toward support for Republican candidates among liberal Protestants as a whole. The accompanying Ϫ.03 estimate in the second column shows that the explanatory power of gender as a causal factor is low. Note that the estimate is negatively signed insofar as the actual (as well as the predicted) overall change in liberal Protestants' vote choice is toward Democratic candidates (and thus is positively signed).
Taken together, the first six factors relating to sociodemographic and church attendance factors do not explain liberal Protestants' trend. They predict, in fact, increased support for Republican candidates during this period. Lower rates of economic satisfaction during Republican presidential administrations, by contrast, have a positive impact on Democratic vote choice, explaining just over 30% of the trend. The next estimate, relating to attitudes toward the welfare state, is negatively signed, indicating that declining liberal Protestant support for the welfare state would have by itself intensified their alignment with the Republican Party.
The main part of the causal story is summarized in the ninth through the eleventh rows of table 8. These results show that liberal Protestants' have become increasingly liberal in their views of social issues relating to gender, abortion, and race, with the result that attitudinal change on these issues explains an impressive 103% of the trend. The fact that the latter proportion exceeds 100% shows that by itself, the expansion of socially liberal attitudes would have resulted in a slightly larger than actual voting trend. Of these three factors, abortion attitudes explain the largest share (43%) of the (predicted) trend, but gender attitudes (20%) and views of the Civil Rights movement (40%) also have had a very substantial impact.
Conservative Protestants and Southern Baptists
Our final analyses return to the case of conservative Protestants and the Christian Right thesis. Our results for the analyses of the 1960-92 period found no evidence of a mobilization or realignment among denominationally conservative Protestants. However, to maintain consistency over the entire time series, we placed all Baptists in the conservative Protestant category. It is, however, possible that Southern Baptists-the largest fundamentalist denomination in the United States-did in fact undergo a shift to the right. This shift could be undetectable in our analysis of the conservative Protestant category if, for instance, Southern Baptists were moving further toward the Republican Party at the same time that other Baptists were moving away from the GOP. These divergent trends would thus cancel one another out leaving the "conservative Protestant" category trendless. To test this hypothesis, we use the NES's more detailed information on religious denomination (available for the 1972-92 surveys) to distinguish between Southern Baptists and other Baptists. Using a dummy variable coded "1" for Southern Baptists (and "0" for the remainder of the "conservative" Protestant category), we analyze the evidence for trends in presidential vote choice within the larger category of conservative Protestants.
The results summarized in table 9 provide no evidence for the hypothesis of a Southern Baptist shift. The Ϫ1 BIC improvement of model 2 (adding to model 1 a term for the main effect of the Baptist variable) provides positive evidence that Southern Baptists' vote choice differed from the rest of the conservative Protestant category during the 1972-92 period. The coefficient for Southern Baptists (.39; SE ϭ .13) is, however, positively signed, indicating that Southern Baptists were in fact more likely than other conservative Protestants to favor Democratic candidates from 1972 through 1992. While this finding is suggestive of lingering Democratic support among Southern white, religious voters, the main point to be appreciated is the absence of trends among Southern Baptists. Neither a linear trend parameter for Southern Baptists (model 3), nor a set of unconstrained interactions of (Southern) Baptist with election (model 4), improves over model 2's fit. Southern Baptists remain slightly less Republican than other Baptists and given the stability of this gap over time, there is no evidence of a "right turn" among Southern Baptists as predicted by the Christian Right thesis.
DISCUSSION
The results of the current study support arguments (summarized in hypothesis 1) that the religious political cleavage has experienced a decline in magnitude. The explanation for this development is, however, not in keeping with either widely held modernization theories of religious development or the thesis of the declining political relevance of religious denominational membership. We find that reestimating change in the religious cleavage to take into account changes in educational and household-income levels yields a comparable picture of overall as well as group-specific changes for the 1960-92 period. This result suggests that growing "affluence" cannot account for political trends in the religious cleavage, as predicted by secularization arguments.
Scholars using dichotomous or trichotomous measures of the religious cleavage (e.g., Wattenberg and Miller 1981; Abramson et al. 1994; Brint and Kelley 1993) have also concluded that declines in the religious cleavage are due to the growing political similarity of Catholics and Protestants. But these formulations do not capture the full story, for our analyses using the seven-category scheme show that the religious cleavage has narrowed precisely because of the growing political heterogeneity of Protestant denominations. Instead of being a function of conservative Protestants' behavior (which shows no net trends) or the behavior of all Protestants, the decline in the religious cleavage is a function of a specific change in the voting behavior of liberal Protestants. Liberal Protestants have fallen out of the earlier, Republican political alignment they shared with moderate and conservative Protestants and moved toward a more neutral voting alignment.
With regard to the Christian Right thesis, this study finds no evidence of a political realignment or increased mobilization among denominationally conservative Protestants. 31 Ironically, the only trend we find for presiden-31 These findings compliment and amplify Davis and Robinson's (1996) study of religious orthodoxy and racial and economic attitudes revealing that the voting behavior of denominationally conservative Protestants shows no evidence of a realignment or net shift in political alignment as predicted by the "culture wars" thesis.
tial vote choice and turnout among conservative Protestants (relative to the mean) relates to their higher than expected levels of turnout and support for (Democrat) Jimmy Carter in 1976 and 1980. This does not mean that a "new" Christian Right cannot be identified but that its base cannot be located denominationally at the presidential level (cf. Wilcox 1986; Hunter 1982, pp. 363-64) . Rates of voter turnout among this group are likewise notable, not because of any trend toward greater participation, but instead because of their unchanging and comparatively low level of mobilization. Given that conservative Protestants were in a Republican alignment prior to the rise of conservative evangelical activists, the challenge for these activists continues to be to one of leading conservative Protestants to the ballot box in the first place. With regard to the third thesis under examination, our results imply that claims about the dealignment of Catholic voters have been significantly overstated. Like Greeley (1985 Greeley ( , 1990 , we conclude that with the exception of the unusual 1960 election Catholics have maintained slightly above-average support for the Democratic Party since 1952, once we control for change or decline in the popularity of Democratic presidential candidates among all religious groups. Our results for Catholics also show that taking 1960 as a baseline would yield biased estimates of political trends among this segment of the electorate. The religious political cleavage was especially high in 1960, not because it was also high in preceding elections of the 1950s, but instead because Catholics became momentarily more Democratic in their party identification and presidential voting preferences.
The single most important source of change in the relationship between religious group membership and political behavior discovered in this study relates to liberal Protestants' eroding support for Republican candidates. Given the historical context covered by our analyses, our findings present a highly consistent portrait of the mechanisms explaining this voting trend. Since the 1960s, liberal Protestants have been under pressure from a clergy that has grown considerably more receptive to calls for a variety of social changes, first stemming from opposition to the Vietnam War and general concerns with civil liberties, to more recent struggles to bring women into the clergy and to allow the equal participation of gays and lesbians in the church. Likewise, since the pivotal Goldwater campaign of 1964-coinciding with the origins of the liberal Protestants' voting trend-socially conservative activists have made considerable inroads into the Republican Party (Brennan 1995) . Opposition to Civil Rights legislation coupled with strong Republican opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment and the increasingly partisan struggle over abortion appear to have provided liberal Protestants with sufficient reason to move away from their traditional alignment with the Republican Party.
The Relative Magnitude of the Religious Political Cleavage While our study finds clear evidence of a net decline stemming from liberal Protestants' voting trend, it is nevertheless important not to understate the magnitude of the religious cleavage. Our index reveals a drop from about .85 in 1960 to a low of .6 in 1980, back up to nearly .7 in 1992. This means that despite remarkable shifts in the political environment as well as rising rates of denominational switching and religious intermarriage (e.g., Roof and McKinney 1987; Wuthnow 1988; Kalmijn 1991) , the average (logit) difference between our seven religious groups and the overall mean at a given election remains well above .5. Presuming a mean of zero for a given election, this .5 logit value means that for a given pair of religious groups, the expected difference in the probability that they will choose the Democratic presidential candidate is a very substantial .12 (e.g., .50 vs. .62).
The results of the current study are informative when compared with results from our related analyses of the class cleavage and the race and gender cleavages (Brooks and Manza, in press) . Using the same index of social cleavages (and data from the same historical period), Hout et al.'s (1995) results reveal that the class cleavage varied between .3 and .4 on the logit scale during the 1952-92 period. Far from approaching the point of insignificance predicted by the "declining cleavage" thesis, the religious cleavage appears to be nearly twice the magnitude of the more widely debated class cleavage. Our comparative analyses of social cleavages in the United States show further that the religious cleavage-while roughly half the magnitude of the race cleavage in the 1964-92 period-is about four times the magnitude of the gender cleavage (Brooks and Manza, in press) .
The preceding comparison is especially telling when juxtaposed with our findings about the relative stability of six of the seven religious groups in our analyses. While the denominationally based religious cleavage has proven to be permeable to contextual effects relating to specific candidates (in particular those of Kennedy, McGovern, and Carter), it is nevertheless a rare event for a specific religious group to move decisively toward or away from support for a major party's presidential candidates. Not only is the magnitude of the religious cleavage considerable, the results of the current study thus suggest little reason to believe that it is likely to experience a major decline in future elections.
APPENDIX Supplementary Analyses of Third Party Voting
Some analysts of religion and political behavior have examined independent presidential candidates (e.g., Gilbert, Johnson, and Peterson 1995) , hypothesizing that third party candidacies activate latent aspects of religious politics that are not observable in the major party choice of the Democratic versus the Republican candidate. To complement our analyses of religious denominations and major party vote choice, we examine the evidence for a religious basis of support for the candidacies of George Wallace in 1968 and Ross Perot in 1992. While both these candidates received a nontrivial share of the popular vote (13.5% and 18.9% respectively), they represent quite different sources of potential relevance to religious voters. Wallace's potential religious appeal stemmed from his socially conservative views on race and his support for segregation early in his career, views that may have resonated with denominationally conservative Protestant voters. Perot, by contrast, may have indirectly appealed to denominationally liberal (and perhaps also moderate) Protestants. Perot's socially moderate and economically conservative views may have made him appear to be an attractive alternative to the Republican and Democratic candidates for these Protestants.
We examine the evidence for a religious group bases of support for Wallace and Perot in table A1. The dependent variable is coded "1" for third party candidate support and "0" for major party candidate choice. As before, we use a logistic regression model, whose coefficients are presented in the columns of the table.
None of the coefficients for the effect of religious group membership on third party vote choice is statistically significant in either 1968 or 1992 (regular church attendance likewise has no significant effect). Statistically significant coefficients reveal that Wallace enjoyed disproportionate support among young, Southern, male voters. Perot's support was mainly among younger men. Comparing our statistical model to a simplified model that does not estimate the effect of religion, we find that deleting the parameters for religious group membership does not result in a significant loss of fit for either 1968 (Ϫ2LL is reduced by 9.99 at 6 df ) or 1992 (Ϫ2LL is reduced by 5.94 at 6 df ). Taken as a whole, these results thus provide no evidence that the political relevance of religious group membership found an expression in the candidacies of George Wallace or Ross Perot. 
